Military Realism: The Logic and Limits of Force and Innovation in the U.S. Army (American Military Experience)

About this book

After the Vietnam War the U.S. Army considered counterinsurgency (COIN) a mistake to be avoided. Many found it surprising then when setbacks in recent conflicts led the same army to adopt a COIN doctrine. Scholarly debates have primarily employed existing theories of military bureaucracy or culture to explain the armys re-embrace of COIN but Peter Campbell advances a unique argument centering on military realism to explain the complex evolution of army doctrinal thinking from 1960 to 2008. In five case studies of U.S. Army doctrine Campbell pits military realism against bureaucratic and cultural perspectives in three key areasnuclear versus conventional warfare preferences for offense versus defense and COIN missionsand finds that the army has been more doctrinally flexible than those perspectives would predict. He demonstrates that decision makers while vowing in the wake of Vietnam to avoid (COIN) missions nonetheless found themselves adapting to the geopolitical realities of fighting low intensity conflicts. In essence he demonstrates that pragmatism has won out over dogmatism. At a time when American policymakers remain similarly conflicted about future defense strategies Campbells work will undoubtedly shape and guide the debate.