The Road To Berlin: Continuing The History Of Stalin's War With Germany

About this book

An analysis of Russian and German military operations from the temporary stalemate at Stalingrad to the total collapse of the German armed forces and political and administrative structures prior to the final destruction of the Berlin defense The Road to Berlin is a history of the strategic and tactical moves and counter-moves of general staff work on the highest and also divisional levels of the dynamics of campaigns and battles and of the total commitment of the two adversaries military and intellectual resources. It is also the history of indomitable courage on both sides ruthless exploitation of opportunities and disasters on the German side caused by Hitlers deranged mind and his control of his general staff. The narrative opens with the drama of the Soviet attempts to to reduce the encircled 6th German Army at Stalingrad a crucial battle that ended in February 1943. It then appeared that the road to the southwest was open but the Red Army was savagely mauled by Mansteins counterblow in the late spring of the same year leading ultimately to the greatest tank battle the world has ever seen. A subsequent powerful Soviet counterattack in late autumn brought the Red Army to the River Dnieper on a broad front. The struggle to seize the initiative in the east was over henceforth the German Army was condemned only to retreat. With the advent of 1944 the situation on the Eastern Front had changed dramatically. The siege of Leningrad had been lifted. Soviet armies were driving deep into the Ukraine and in the north the Soviets were beginning to encircle the powerful and formidable Army Group North. Meanwhile Stalin and the soviet command hoped for the opening of the second front which after agonized months of waiting finally materialized in June 1944. But by the time the Soviet command had decided to go it alone. In a massive surprise attach the Red Army launched itself against Army Group Center in Belorussia and virtually overwhelmed the German opponent. The way north into Poland and East Prussia lay open to the Soviets; the path to the south and into the Balkans was equally accessible. By the late autumn of 1944 Soviet armies were slicing through German defenses in the north and driving into the Baltic states while in the south more Soviet divisions were knocking Romania out of the war. By the end of the year it was all too apparent that the race for Germany was on and the Red Armyprodded by Stalinintended to win it. Stalin was equally determined that Soviet troops should take Prague. This is the unadorned often brutal story of the Soviet road from liberation to conquest. It utilizes Soviet military records and archives German military records East European materials and commentary from non-Soviet sources. Erickson has written as well the story of the influence of Soviet military doctrine on the conduct of very large multiservice operations involving practically all branches of the Soviet military forces. It is full of significant lessons for the assessment of Soviet military capabilities today and in the future.