HomeHistory BooksThe Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform
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The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform

hardcoverOctober 1, 1992
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ISBN-13: 9780700605415 ISBN-10: 070060541X
Publisher
University Press of Kansas
Binding
hardcover
Published
October 1, 1992
Weight
1.3 lbs
Dimensions
23.50×3.20×15.90 cm

About this book

The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform by Corum, James S.. hardcover edition. ISBN: 9780700605415.

Following Germanys defeat in World War I, the Germans signed the Versailles Treaty, superficially agreeing to limit their war powers. The Allies envisioned the future German army as a lightly armed border guard and international security force. The Germans had other plans. As early as 1919, James Corum contends, the tactical foundations were being laid for the Nazi Blitzkrieg. Between 1919 and 1933, German military leaders created and nurtured the Reichswehr, a new military organization built on the wreckage of the old Imperial Army. It was not being groomed for policing purposes. Focusing on Hans von Seeckt, General Staff Chief and Army Commander, Corum traces the crucial transformations in German military tactical doctrine, organization, and training that laid the foundations for fighting Germanys future wars. In doing so, he restores balance to prior assessment of von Seeckts influence and demonstrates how the general, along with a few other "visionary" officers--including armor tactician Ernst Volckheim and air tactician Helmut Wilberg--collaborated to develop the core doctrine for what became the Blitzkrieg. The concepts of mobile war so essential to Germanys strength in World War II, Corum shows, were in place well before the tools became available. As an unforeseen consequence of the Versailles Treaty, the Germans were not saddled with a stockpile of outdated equipment as the Allies were. This, ironically, resulted in an advantage for the Germans, who were able to create doctrine first and design equipment to match it. This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.